

Report Date: 1 July 1946  
Info Date: July 45- July 46

Subj: Techniques of Soviet Intelligence: Berlin July 1945 - July 1946

General  
Germany

### VIII. TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL GUIDANCE OF AGENTS

A. Training Schools: We have no knowledge of agent training schools in the Soviet Zone, although we hear unconfirmed reports to this effect rather frequently. In contrast, existence of at least one training school for Communist Party recruits is reliably established. Assuming the Soviet policy to be that of employing agents in great quantities rather than through qualitative selection, the S.I.S. might believe such schools unnecessary. The fact that some of their more important agents have not received such training need not indicate that no such schools exist in Germany, because these agents are often highly trained Abwehr men, (who in some instances have been released from British or American internment camps). In one or two instances, however, Soviet agents known to us have had no training and badly needed it for the ambitious assignments given to them.

B. Indoctrination Outside of School in Principles of Secret Service: One is surprised to find how little emphasis the Soviets place upon general security, indoctrination, etc., even in the case of agents run by more important S.I.S. officers. Agents are seldom coached in the concept of cover, forged papers, counter-measures against surveillance, and other items of the trade. Abwehr alumni who have attempted to point out the importance of these matters, particularly cover, to the controlling Soviet officer, have discovered what was to them a most discouraging lack of appreciation for finesse in playing the double life of an agent. It is impossible to completely dismiss this indifference with the thought that the controlling officer didn't care whether his agents got blown or not, because Soviet officers with Abwehr agents have been known to consider them extremely important in obtaining personal advancement.

C. Briefing for the Mounting of Particular Missions: Again, such briefing, by traditional secret service standards, is highly inadequate. Even agents who had been recruited (by pressure) with the hope that they could lead the Soviets to atomic research experts were given no briefing as to how to account for their disappearance from home during three days of Soviet incarceration. Other agents have been told to "get close to the Americans", or to "get recruited by CIC", without the slightest suggestion as to how they, inexperienced in intelligence, were supposed to do these things. The usual Soviet reply to an agent's profession of incompetence in starting on an assignment, is "Don't mind the details, do it." Instances exist of slightly more thorough assistance, but the general technique seems to be put the agent on his own, armed perhaps with a car, liquor, cigarettes, and lucre, and tell him to bring home confidential reports on a given subject. When, for example, papers are needed, the agent is often instructed to obtain them himself from the German borough government. He may bribe or steal his way through. The Soviet method of instilling fear or failure does accomplish results in obtaining papers, but, because the untrained man is clumsy, seldom permits an agent to make great progress in penetrating American or British circles without giving himself away. Therefore, the Abwehr recruits who are naturally more adept, constitute the greatest threat to the Western Allies locally. In police circles, again, we find some exceptions. There, for example, the Soviets do provide real but illegally acquired police passes to their kidnap squads.